Technology adoption in local government: Crossing the Chasm

Foreword

This is the second of the 'long' reports output as part of the TALK project. Once again, it differs from the shorter, punchier materials that make up most of TALK. This report is designed to be easy-to-read, but not quick to assimilate. It is designed to provoke thought and discussion. It aspires to make you think again about how new technology is 'sold' to the public organisations that must adopt it. The longer format is designed to achieve this.

By way of background, it seems that for as long as any of us can remember, the public sector has been asked to compare itself with the private sector. In the popular imagination, the result is rarely flattering. Competition, it seems, is almost a panacea. It drives people to work harder, act more creatively and to be more efficient. The private sector always takes the prize in the popular imagination.

Of course, we all know that it is not so simple. In fact, there are pros and cons to each sector. So, having got that straight, maybe the real task is to share knowledge between the sectors, rather than to necessarily swap one for another. Maybe it is the know-how and knowledge that makes the difference, rather than competition per se.

So, this report faces up to the question of how new technology is adopted by local government. It is surely a big question as so much of the continuing reform agenda, either implicitly or explicitly, hangs on the ability of local government to successfully utilize new technology. So, if local government needs new technology, how are its many stakeholders being involved in the processes of adoption? How are they being 'sold' the technology? What problems are they being asked to solve? What do the technology 'ambassadors' in each local authority know about life lived in the pressure-cooker of day-to-day service delivery? Do they know enough? Do they say enough? Do they present the right messages to the right audiences?

If you think about it, every IT company in the world faces a similar set of problems. So how do they go about this task of encouraging adoption? What knowledge do they possess?

One key idea is that of 'the chasm'. This was developed by the leading academic, Geoffrey Moore. This report uses Moore's ideas, taking them out of their normal market context, in order to shed light on the issue of technology adoption in local government. What does it tell us about how the enthusiasts and ambassadors go about their work? What assumptions does it expose about who does what in normal local authority structures?

This report is organised in eight sections:

Introduction
Learning from Global Technology Companies: The Chasm Model
Understanding the Chasm Model
The Chasm in Technology Adoption
Understanding the Early Sectors
Crossing the Chasm
Using the Chasm as a lens to Study Local Authority Projects
Conclusions

Finally, a provocative question: next time there is a major event about new technology in local government, which stakeholders will attend from your authority? Will it be the IT specialists? Might it be a subset of the IT specialists (i.e. those who like the new stuff)? Or will it be the mainstream managers in housing, social services, children's services etc?

Maura Brooks, Chief Officer (ICT), Leeds City Council, 2006.

Professor Peter Kawalek, Manchester Business School, 2006.

Introduction

There is huge pressure on UK local government to reduce costs and deliver first-rate citizen services through the effective and efficient use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). The potential of ICT lies at the heart of many local government initiatives and it is having an increasing impact on all aspects of our daily lives. However, for many in local government the decision to adopt innovative ICT is a very difficult challenge. There is the potential of savings and improved citizen services; but there is also the danger of project difficulties or even failure.
The common public perception is that public sector ICT projects at best run late and over-budget. At worst they have to be scrapped before they are completed. This means that ICT is controversial. Citizens do not ordinarily demand innovative ICT from their local councils, as it has no value in itself. They certainly do not want "their council taxes" wasted on technology that does not work. Instead they focus their demands on the general principles of effective, efficient and accessible services. Clearly then local government must steer a careful course to harvest benefits from ICT innovation.

Learning from the Global Technology Companies: The Chasm Model

Unfortunately, there are no easy answers. However, in other sectors, the problem of technology adoption is better understood. Perhaps the most eminent author writing on this topic is Geoffrey Moore. His famous books like "Crossing the Chasm" and "Inside the Tornado" are very widely cited. Notably, many of the most famous CEOs and senior managers of global technology companies have been amongst those who have publicly acknowledged the value of his insights. These companies depend for their existence on their ability to promote technology adoption, so this is no small testament to Moore.

In a nutshell, the "Chasm" model alerts companies to the fact that different messages are needed for different audiences. A new technology will quickly attract enthusiasts (typically, its staple IT audience or a subset that is interested in the latest generation technology) but will struggle to 'convert' wider audiences with the same messages. This is because these messages must change if the technology is to progress to wide acceptance. This applies both to conventional consumer audiences and to internal corporate users.
If we focus on the local government family, this seems to say:

That we can expect many IT staff to come quickly on-board with new projects, for them to turn up at events and promotions, etc., but for them to struggle to convince their wider audience of social workers, environmental health officers, managers, teachers etc.
This wider audience (social workers, environmental health officers, managers, teachers etc) does not come aboard in the same way because they rely on different messages. It is not that they are sceptical, but more that they have a different perspective on technology projects and different priorities that need to be met.

This simple insight is at the heart of the 'chasm' idea. On one side sit the 'enthusiasts' and 'visionaries' whilst on the other sit the mainstream managers and pragmatists. The danger is that one community never really talks to the other in terms that make sense and that consequently IT remains in the province of the IT teams.

Of course, there is much more to Moore's ideas than this, and there is the important caveat that it is a free-market model. It is not going to apply unaltered to the world of local government. Nonetheless it does seem to offer immediate insight and questions. Have local government IT initiatives crossed the chasm? Have they become the immediate concern of well-informed social workers, environmental health officers, managers, teachers etc? What about wider partners in the voluntary sector? What about citizens at large? Can this 'mainstream' audience articulate what IT does for them, what advantages it brings? Do they respond to it with enthusiasm?

What is the evidence of eGovernment projects?
What is the evidence of other ICT projects?

Understanding the Chasm Model

Two decades before Geoffrey Moore, another eminent writer described technology adoption as a "bell curve" divided into a number of sectors according to the characteristics of the adopting organisations. That writer was Everett Rogers. Figure 1 shows a typical example of the curve he described. The horizontal dimension is time - the lifetime of the adoption of a particular technology. The vertical dimension represents the number of adopters.

Figure 1: Basic technology adoption curve

According to this model, when a technology is new it is adopted by the "Innovators" (I). These are the technology enthusiasts and adopt new ideas essentially "because they are new". Next come the "early adopters" (EA). They take on new ideas because they have a vision of how the technology could be important to them. The "pragmatist" sector (P) is much bigger and sits behind the early adopters. Pragmatists adopt technology because they recognise that it is necessary for them to do so in order to continue to operate effectively. In simple terms, they buy it for what is worth to them, now. The final sector represents the "tail" (T) being those audiences that resist new ideas completely.

Your Authority

Think about some of the managers in your local authority. Try to characterise them. Are they likely to be innovators? Do they tend to be early adopters? Are they pragmatists (most are)? Might they be the tail?
Think about local government technology events (key exhibitions, expos, interest groups, workshops and groups). Who tends to attend them? Do any events attract the pragmatists i.e. the mainstream managers who take technology for what it is worth to them ?

The Chasm in Technology Adoption

Geoffrey Moore adds another insight to the bell curve, by showing that in practice adoption curves for specific technologies do not fit the ideal curve. Moore observed that there are gaps between the different sectors; gaps which specific technologies fail to bridge. For example, some technologies may only be taken up by Innovators and fail even to reach the early adopter sector. Most importantly however, Moore identified a significant gap between the early adopter sector and the early majority sector. This he called the Chasm (see figure 2).

Figure 2: The Chasm

The Chasm is particularly important for technology developers because it reveals the difficulty in getting a product into mass acceptance. In particular, there is a Catch-22 in persuading pragmatists to adopt new technology. This is that pragmatists demand credible references that demonstrate realised value. However, the only credible reference for a pragmatist is another pragmatist. They do not consider innovators and early adopters as providing credible references.

Moore identifies fundamental characteristics of visionaries that alienate pragmatists and make them unsuitable references.

Lack of respect for the value of colleagues' experiences
Taking a greater interest in technology than in their industry
Failing to recognise the importance of existing product infrastructure

From the pragmatists' perspective, the visionaries concentrate on their pet technology projects, and leave the awkward detailed problems of making it really work to others. So, you can have It event after IT event. You can have bold and flashy demonstrations of the potential of IT. You can give away stress balls and tins of mints. You can write reports, host workshops and animate your Powerpoint in every conceivable way. But still you will not convert the major audiences in the mainstream of local government. For what the hard-pressed mainstream wants to hear is a reassuring message from another mainstream manager who already has the technology working. It is catch-22.

The Pragmatists

Pragmatists might be housing managers, social workers, back-office managers or similar. They prioritise their own services and the needs of their clients. They are not interested in technology for its own sake, but only for what it can do for them.
Do you recognise this from your own organisation? Do you recognise the Catch-22 outlined above? Do you know people who fit this model? And where do you fit? Are you a visionary and if so, does this mean that you are one of those who will "leave the awkward detailed problems of making it really work to others"? If so, is there a way in which you can better adapt to the reality of the technology adoption process?

Understanding the Early Sectors

The Innovators and Early Adopters are shown on the left hand side of the chasm. The characteristics relevant to these groups include the following:

The buyer will be a visionary line of business executive whose reason to buy is that he/she believes that the technology will provide a significant advantage. In local authorities this is different. The nearest equivalent to this is likely to be the IT Director, who investigates or invests in a technology because he or she believes it will be in someway advantageous to the authority.
The adoption of the technology will require close collaboration between the provider and the buyer as between them they develop the application of the technology to the buyer's vision and advantage. This could well include the need to work with others in order to fulfil the buyer's needs. In the local government world, this is similar to the ways in which technology providers partner with local authorities in special projects (e.g. the eGovernment National Projects).
An advantage for the provider will be the fact that the pricing can reflect the strong and individual customer relationship
The provider should normally be positioned as a technology leader, supporting the adopter by its technology excellence. Again, this resonates with the way in which many technology providers participated in national projects.

This places demands on the provider, not only to be excellent in its technological field, but also in its ability to work closely with the adopter.

Your Experience

Have you been in this position? Have you been a local authority Early Adopter (or Innovator), working with a company to develop new technology solutions? How have they risen to the challenge? Did they understand the need to build reference material so that, later, the pragmatists could be brought on board? Did they, alternatively, want to treat you as 'just another client'? And were you aware of the dynamics affecting the relationship? Were you able to build a case for crossing the chasm?

Crossing the Chasm

The argument is that many technologies and ideas do not move beyond the early adopter market. Such "failure" is not necessarily a failure of the technology per se. It does not necessarily mean that the technology could not have been usefully used by the wider audience beyond the chasm. Instead it might be simply a failure of the technology providers to do what is required to make the technology sufficiently appealing to pragmatic buyers.
The key to achieving mass acceptance is to ensure that the chasm is bridged. This is done by ensuring that, once a technology has established itself amongst early adopters, there is a clear plan for moving on from this and achieving a foothold with the early pragmatists. In particular, to cross the chasm, the technology providers need to develop "lighthouse" implementations that then facilitate the development of a "whole product". This idea of a "whole product" is very important. It encompasses everything that is necessary to give the pragmatic customer a compelling reason to get involved. Earlier, visionaries wanted the core generic product, because they had their own ideas about how to apply this in their business. Pragmatists are different. They want a whole product that addresses a clear business problem. It must be capable of being understood as a solution to a problem that they have. For example, it might reduce the cycle time of processing an application in a benefits office. It might achieve a manager's Gershon targets. It might guarantee more efficient procurement, or address low social-worker morale by allowing new ways of working. And the whole product is whole. It comes complete with its installation method (so the manager knows what is needed to achieve x), training, support, manuals, cables, additional software or hardware, installation instructions, professional services, etc. In short, pragmatists look for off-the-shelf offerings.
These ideas of "whole product" are described by Moore using the analogy of a bowling alley. The head pin (i.e. the one that you want to hit first) is a specific niche where acceptance of the technology by pragmatic buyers should easily allow reference sales in further sub-markets (see figure 3). From here onwards, the technology may be applied using a similar application in different market segments or may be used in different ways within a segment. The important point throughout is that there is a high degree of reference within the markets, both within and across the segments.

Figure 3: Bowling Alley

Innovation Leeds

When Innovation Leeds discovered the Digital Pen and Paper concept, the initial reaction was "this must be useful somewhere!" Such a reaction is typical of early adopters. However, from there Leeds Innovation proceeded to work on making the Digital Pen and Paper into a whole product focused at social workers. They have been building lighthouse implementations, which are helping them to solve the problem of data collection amongst social workers. The idea ultimately is to give them an alternative to the use of the keyboard in sensitive, face-to-face situations. If all goes well, using the references of these social workers, Leeds Innovation will be able to sell a whole product solution into new markets (the left hand side of the bowling alley) and sell new products to social workers (the right hand side).

The Strange World of the Anti-Metric

One of the interesting features in the Chasm model is the idea that there are metrics and anti-metrics. Metrics are very well understood in the public sector where there is great expertise in governing organisations through performance measures. Anti-metrics, however, are not part of public sector culture. Maybe they are inimical to the whole idea of a public ethos.
The basic idea is simple. As a technology moves along the adoption curve the metric that best measures the success of the provider changes. For example, very early on in the early-market (left hand side of the Chasm), technology providers will be motivated by the number and size of major deals. Later, when they are over the chasm, profit and market-share will become key metrics.
However, at each stage there are also anti-metrics. These are measures that are dangerous to the technology provider at a particular point in the technology adoption lifecycle. For example, early on, profit margins are an anti-metric. It can be perilous to a provider for it to stress profit margins when it is dealing with innovators and early adopters. It should, instead, just look for the deals that will provide the references to the later pragmatists. It should be preparing for mass-adoption. Even customer satisfaction can be an anti-metric. This is when companies are fighting for market share amongst the pragmatists at the top of the bell-curve (what Moore calls the tornado effect). At this point, companies will risk declining customer satisfaction rather than give up the fight for market share. Recent news stories about customer complaints about broadband services illustrate this principle. As broadband becomes commonplace, each provider knows that it is more dangerous to cede market share to rivals than it is to sacrifice its own customer satisfaction performance.

A Simplified Version of Metrics & Anti-Metrics

	Likely Metric	Likely Anti-Metric
Early (left hand side of the Chasm)	Number and size of major deals	Margins
Mass market (pragmatists)	Market share, profit	Sometimes customer satisfaction will be an anti-metric
Laggards	Customer satisfaction	Sales of latest product versions

Anti-Metrics

The concepts of metrics and anti-metrics are different to the ways in which performance measures apply in the public sector. However, it can be useful to know about them:

When working with technology providers, have you known what their key metrics and anti-metrics are? Can you work it out from the maturity and popularity of their technology? Have you, perhaps, given in to an argument that the provider needs to make profit when, in fact, they are in the early stages of market development, and what really matters to them is the deal itself?
Have you worked with a technology provider on a popular, mass-market product and found that they seem prepared to sacrifice your customer satisfaction? What steps can you take to ensure this does not happen again?

Using the Chasm as a Lens to Study Local Authority Projects

To go back to basics, Geoffrey Moore's work was intended for technology markets. It was not written for the public sector. Using it here in the context of a local government study, we can gain direct insight into the behaviour of private sector partners and, potentially, some insights into the different audiences involved in IT projects in the government sector. We can think of it as a lens that we can use, that we can play around with, in order to get some alternative insights into why projects do or do not work.

We have already used it to introduce the idea of local government audience for IT projects, i.e. the social workers, environmental health officers, managers, teachers etc.
We have begun to explore how the model helps us understand the motivations and behaviour of private sector partners.
We can also think about the public audience for government IT projects. For example, are local authority websites already across the chasm and well into the "Main Street" of public use? What about the Inland Revenue's tax site? What projects have not made it across?

Staying with the basics, perhaps the most obvious point about the Chasm model is that technology providers want to cross the divide. They want to take greater risks for greater rewards. Indeed, if they do not take these risks, the detail of Geoffrey Moore's narrative shows that they stand to lose everything. Someone else will take the risks that they refuse to take and put them out of the race.

If we now turn the lens to a local authority and position the local authority IT manager, does this risks/rewards relationship work in this altered context? It does, but only to a degree. Clearly the IT manager does not have an immediate set of personal rewards to strive for, and nor does she have the threat of removal by a competing company. But she or he does have the satisfaction of doing her job well, positively affecting public service and achieving managerial targets. It is not quite the same as for his or her private sector equivalent, but there is a risk/rewards relationship.

Now, suppose that the lens is moved from internal local authority projects to national projects. What drives the local authority IT manager to cross the Chasm, and make his or her project a national success, hailed by the mainstream of local government? There are some powerful motivations in the form of national prestige, and associations with the central government departments. But are these enough? They might not be especially as the pressures of a national project will add to, and possibly compete with, pressures in the manager's own local authority. There is a weaker relationship between risks and rewards.

Motivating Factors

What motivates local authorities to take part in national projects? Are the rewards enough? Once started in a national project, is it actually more sensible to resist crossing the chasm to the mainstream of local government than take on the effort and risks 'on behalf of everybody else?' What are your experiences?

Exploring this further, the Chasm 'lens' shows the progress made by key projects.

[Connected Cumbria] - Developing the 'whole product' offering

The Connected Cumbria Partnership (CCP) has been a successful project involving all the councils in Cumbria and developing some common transactions on a common platform. With these common transactions, CCP is building up case evidence but has not yet crossed the chasm. It is not yet a 'whole product' offering that pragmatists in other authorities can just pick up and utilize. Neither is it yet configured as a simple solution to a recognised problem (CCP's flexibility will actually confuse the pragmatists on the other side of the chasm). However it is making progress. The stories of its development and success in Cumbria will act as a lighthouse helping to comfort and convince the pragmatists in the mainstream of other authorities.

[DP&P] - Private sector ethos in the public sector.

One of the most innovative aspects of the Digital Pen and Paper (DP&P) project is how it has been organised. Leeds has created a sub-group, Innovation Leeds, whose mission is to be a supplier of innovative technologies to the council and the local government sector beyond.

In effect, this means that the managers in Innovation Leeds operate in private-sector like conditions. Therefore, perhaps it should not be surprising that DP&P is impersonating the behaviour of a private company in the way in which it crosses the chasm.

It has a defined offering - DP&P solves the problem of data entry to electronic systems; a traditional problem in the sensitive circumstances of client interviews.
It is building substantial reference material from councils beyond Leeds.
It is increasingly trying to present itself as a 'whole product' offering, wherein the pen and data-transfer problems are solved as one.

In summary then, the DP&P project is already poised to move across the chasm and to establish something akin to a "bowling alley." However, as this report is written, it remains very early for DP&P in terms of its major audience adoption. The "lighthouses" will have to be convincing, the "whole product" will have to be sufficiently focused. User figures will be reported in TALK and read with interest.

A Reversal of Roles and Other Useful Complications

Are we being too kind to your IT department? So far, this report has assumed that it is that department, or more likely some members of it, that take up positions on the left of the chasm and try to bring new technology into the organisation. This would be in accord with the strategic role of IT departments. However, many readers may have different experiences to relate. Anecdotal evidence from across the sector suggests that often IT departments seek to block progress across the chasm, often arguing against a business 'visionary' who believes new technology may be useful in his or her business sector (e.g. Housing, Economic Development, Planning etc.). Rather than welcome the enthusiasm and assist in developing the whole product offering, the IT department seeks to block or slow progress, typically citing:

Standards e.g. "We don't allow that kind of software in this organisation."
Support e.g. "You can buy it, but you'll be on your own when it breaks."
Security e.g. "I'm sorry, all our systems are locked down for security reasons."
Priorities e.g. "Yes, it is a nice idea. Let's have a chat about it when we've got through our other priorities."

Thus, instead of being the strategic leaders, your IT department might be the strategic blockers of new technology. If they do play this role, is it because they have good reason, genuine concern? Or is it because they have an investment in the status quo? Indeed, could it be that they lack the skills needed for technology adoption? Perhaps it is that they do not understand the chasm concept?

Geoffrey Moore's Chasm work provides us with a lens, a way of seeing things. Deciding whether your IT department is on the left or the right of the chasm is one of the ways in which it can help you. There are also other ways in which we can usefully complicate the model. For example, the model assumes that there is a market of some sort on the right hand side. But is there? Is there a stable, economic platform on the far reaches of the chasm?

One big complication for many local authority initiatives is that there is no mature structure on the right hand side. This problem often cripples key, partnership initiatives. The point is that ultimately someone has to pay for the technology that is needed. If you are working in partnership with other agencies in order to develop some new service or arrangement that relies on new technology then, most likely, you are acting as visionaries on the left hand side of the chasm. Unless some or all of the agencies are prepared to pay for the technology investment that is needed, you are likely to remain stranded on this left hand side of the chasm. Its that classic problem of partnership: people can agree the vision, but agencies do not like the idea of funding technology on behalf of their partners. Indeed, legally, they might be prohibited from doing so.

It is a sobering thought that many key partnership initiatives may never succeed, because there is actually no funding model for them to succeed. Building the partnership vision is one thing, paying for it through capital and resource programmes, is another.

[Excelsis] - A traditional user-group.

The Excelsis performance management package is disseminated through a traditional user-group model. As such, it is not actively promoted, but relies on enquiries to build its membership. Thus it is very different to both CCP and DP&P. However, in its particular circumstances, the user group might be the foundation of a successful approach. Excelsis is concerned with performance management and therefore relates to a very-widely recognised set of issues. Every local authority manager in the country is in some way concerned with performance management. In this light, the user group is valuable because it allows the development of the reference material that will convince the pragmatists in the wider local government family. However, the chasm lens suggests that the user-group will not be enough to ensure widespread adoption. Excelsis will need to be proven as an 'off-the-shelf' whole-product offering, that is easy to take up across the local government family. Moreover, unlike CCP and DP&P, it also has substantial existing competition (in the eye of the pragmatists), and therefore will be subject to hostile market conditions. In summary then, Excelsis is close to being configured as a solution that could cross the chasm but needs the commercial push that will turn it into an 'off-the-shelf' package that is able to compete in a marketplace.

Conclusion

Geoffrey Moore's writings are respected by many of the world's most famous technology companies. This is because his work helps them understand the audiences and processes involved in the development of new technology products. Moore has been able to show that many potentially good solutions fail because they were never presented in the right way to the large, pragmatic audiences that we can call the 'mainstream.' Looking at his work here, in the circumstance of local government projects, is to take it out of context. Frankly, that is the case. Nonetheless, its essential messages seem to be illuminating and do provide a coherent plan as to how specific projects can make further progress.
Essentially, there is a simple discipline behind this. To make a bridge to the mainstream audience for new technology projects, it has to be understood that new messages are needed. The same messages that attracted the innovators and early adopters will not carry weight in the mass audience.

The bigger community needs the proof of reference material from other pragmatic sites.
It needs a whole product offering, something as close to a complete 'off-the-shelf' package as possible.
This whole product offering must address a recognised problem and present a compelling solution (e.g. it might reduce the cycle time of processing an application in a benefits office. It might achieve a manager's Gershon targets. It might guarantee more efficient procurement, or address low social-worker morale by allowing new ways of working.)

Has local government operated like this to date? If not, if it has not gone with conviction and compelling messages to its own 'mainstream' managers, then perhaps it needs to adopt the discipline of the chasm now. The three points above can help with this as they can be used to critique technology initiatives. For example, how successful have national eGovernment projects been in building reference material and creating 'off-the-shelf', whole product and compelling solutions? What is your opinion? Is it time to reflect on how projects are organised in your authority and across the sector as a whole? Looking forward, which of the three organisational models outlined above (CCP, Leeds Innovation and Excelsis user-Group) are most likely to successfully convert other authorities to new technology? Are there lessons for other parts of the public sector? These are points that can be debated. One thing is certainly clear, however, and this is that the ICT needed for public sector reform will continue to be a problem until the mainstream audiences hear what they need to hear, until they see the compelling solutions to recognised problems, and until they can have off-the-shelf, whole solutions. This is what the lens tells us.